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Abstract: 
In recent years, a number of papers have established a new empirical regularity. Stocks 
of distressed firms vastly underperform those of financially healthy firms. It is not nec-
essary to attribute the negative excess returns of distressed firms to inefficient or irra-
tional markets. We show that negative excess returns are the equilibrium outcome when 
a subset of participants is able to draw returns ￿in kind￿ from distressed companies. For 
firms close to bankruptcy, non-cash returns to ownership will be the dominant form of 
return to equity. If markets expect a contest for control, these returns will show up in 
stock valuation. The governance problem described here creates a link between the 
financial position of a firm and real allocation that may amplify macroeconomic real or 
financial shocks. 
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Non Technical Summary 
In recent years, a number of papers have established a new empirical regularity. The 
stocks of distressed companies vastly underperform those of financially healthy firms. 
The difference is magnified if returns are corrected using a CAPM or a Fama-French 
three-factor model.  
This paper aims to show that the overpricing of distressed firms, defined as a premium 
of the market price over the value of expected cash flows to shareholders, is an equilib-
rium phenomenon and that capital market inefficiencies do not need to be invoked. In a 
nutshell, the explanation is this: 
￿  With an increasing probability of default, there is a greater incentive to withdraw 
resources from the firm as private, non-dividend benefits. Shareholders will feel the 
full opportunity costs only in states where default does not occur. If default is cer-
tain, withdrawing resources is a free lunch. In this paper, this is termed "wrecking". 
￿  For distressed companies, private benefits as a percentage of total benefits to equity 
are large. In a takeover contest, these private benefits are revealed in the form of a 
premium over the expected cash payments. In addition, the probability of a takeover 
contest is high. Frequently the original controlling majority will not be suited to 
drawing high non-cash benefits from the failing firm.  
￿  The expectation of a high premium leads to share prices in excess of expected cash 
payments even before the contest.  
The governance problem described here creates a link between the financial position of 
a firm and real allocation that may amplify macroeconomic real or financial shocks.  
Nicht technische Zusammenfassung 
In den letzten Jahren hat eine Reihe von Aufs￿tzen eine neue empirische Regelm￿￿ig-
keit belegt. Die Aktien von wirtschaftlich in Bedr￿ngnis geratenen Unternehmen weisen 
deutlich geringere Gesamtertr￿ge auf. Der Unterschied vergr￿￿ert sich noch, wenn Er-
tr￿ge durch Anwendung eines CAPM- oder eines Drei-Faktoren-Modells nach Fama 
und French korrigiert werden.  
Ziel dieses Aufsatzes ist es, zu zeigen, dass die ￿berbewertung angeschlagener Unter-
nehmen, definiert als ￿berschuss des Marktpreises ￿ber den Wert der erwarteten Net-
tozahlungen, ein gleichgewichtiges Ph￿nomen ist und dass daher nicht auf ineffiziente 
Finanzm￿rkte verwiesen werden muss. Die Erkl￿rung daf￿r ist wie folgt: 
￿  Mit gr￿￿er werdender Ausfallwahrscheinlichkeit existiert ein st￿rkerer Anreiz, 
Unternehmensressourcen privaten Nutzungen zuzuf￿hren. Aktion￿re tragen die Op-
portunit￿tskosten solcher privaten Nutzungen nur in den F￿llen, in denen es nicht 
zum Bankrott kommt. Im Extremfall, bei sicherem Bankrott, ist die Nutzung von 
Unternehmensressourcen f￿r private Zwecke aus Sicht der Eigent￿mer v￿llig kos-
tenlos. Dies wird hier als ￿wrecking￿ (etwa: "Pl￿nderung") bezeichnet.  
￿  F￿r angeschlagene Unternehmen ist der Anteil privater Nutzungen an den Gesamter-
tr￿gen des Eigenkapitals gro￿. Im Falle eines ￿bernahmewettstreits f￿hren diese 
privaten Nutzungen zu einer Differenz zwischen Kaufpreis und erwarteten Netto-
zahlungsstr￿men. Die Wahrscheinlichkeit eines solchen ￿bernahmewettstreits ist 
hoch. Die urspr￿nglichen Mehrheitsaktion￿re sind n￿mlich oft nicht selbst in der 
Lage, hohe nicht-finanzielle Ertr￿ge aus einem angeschlagenen Unternehmen zu 
ziehen.  
￿  Schon vor einem m￿glichen ￿bernahmewettstreit liegt daher, in Erwartung einer 
hohen Pr￿mie, der Aktienkurs ￿ber dem Wert der erwarteten Nettozahlungsstr￿me. 
Der hier beschriebene Mechanismus schafft einen Zusammenhang zwischen dem Fi-
nanzstatus von Unternehmen und realen Allokationsentscheidungen, der die Folgen 
realer oder finanzwirtschaftlicher St￿rungen verst￿rken kann.  
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A ‘Wreckers Theory’ of Financial Distress
*) 
 
wrě’cker n. In vbl senses; one who tries from shore to bring about shipwreck 
with view to profiting from wreckage, or one who steals such wreckage; person 
employed in demolition or in recovering wrecked ship or its contents [...]
1 
1 Overview 
In recent years, a number of papers have established a new empirical regularity. 
The stocks of distressed companies vastly underperform those of financially healthy 
firms. Common sense would expect the former to yield higher, as distressed firms are 
more leveraged on average and therefore riskier. And the difference is magnified if re-
turns are corrected using a CAPM or a Fama-French three-factor model. Researchers 
speak of "mispricing" and of "a challenge to standard models of rational asset pricing in 
which the structure of the economy is stable and well understood by investors".
2 
This paper aims to show that the overpricing of distressed firms, defined as a 
premium of the market price over the value of expected cash flows to shareholders, is an 
equilibrium phenomenon and that capital market inefficiencies do not need to be in-
voked. In a nutshell, the explanation is this: 
￿  With an increasing probability of default, there is a greater incentive to withdraw 
resources from the firm as private, non-dividend benefits. Shareholders will feel the 
full opportunity costs only in states where default does not occur. If default is cer-
tain, withdrawing resources is a free lunch. In this paper, this is termed "wrecking". 
￿  For distressed companies, private benefits as a percentage of total benefits to equity 
(including cash dividends and liquidation payments) are large. In a takeover contest, 
these private benefits are revealed in the form of a premium over the expected cash 
                                                 
*) Correspondence: Ulf von Kalckreuth, Deutsche Bundesbank, Economics Dept., Wilhelm Epstein-Str. 
14, D-60431 Frankfurt, Germany, e-mail: ulf.von-kalckreuth@bundesbank.de. The opinions expressed 
in this paper are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Deutsche Bundes-
bank. A first version of this paper was presented at the Seventh Bundesbank Spring Conference, "Mac-
roeconomic risk and policy responses" in Berlin, 27-28 May 2005, as a discussion of Campbell et al. 
(2005). Since then, it has been expanded and revised. Without implicating anybody, I wish to thank 
John Campbell, George von Furstenberg, Heinz Herrmann, Johannes Hoffmann, Matthias Hoffmann, 
Christian Laux, Joachim Keller, Bruno Solnik, Harald Uhlig and Christian Upper for their helpful dis-
cussions and comments. 
1   From the Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English, sixth edition. 
2   Griffin and Lemmon (2002) and Campbell et al. (2005), respectively.   2 
payments. In addition, the probability of a takeover contest is high. Frequently the 
original controlling will not be suited to drawing high non-cash benefits from the 
failing firm.  
￿  The expectation of a high premium leads to share prices in excess of expected cash 
payments even before the contest.  
The private benefits going to the controlling shareholders are a large part of the total 
value of equity when the firm is distressed, but these returns are invisible. However, if a 
control contest is expected, they will be reflected ￿ fully or partly ￿ in the price. There-
fore, the price is too high to be justified by cash payouts or later capital gains. 
The contribution of our paper is threefold. First, we give an efficient-market inter-
pretation of an important stock market anomaly. Second, by doing so, we link work on 
private benefits to the literature on the empirics of asset pricing. Third, we show that the 
financial structure and the probability of default may be important for determining the 
size of private benefits of control. This topic has largely been treated in the context of 
agency costs of equity, with controlling shareholders or managers exploiting minority 
shareholders. We show that agency costs of debt also play a role and may become 
overwhelming when the firm is distressed. The mechanism described here creates a link 
between the financial position of a firm and real allocation that may amplify macroeco-
nomic real or financial shocks. 
In Section 2, we start by summarising the empirical evidence. The wreckers the-
ory of corporate distress is laid out in Section 3, after presenting other attempts to ex-
plain the anomaly. Section 4 models the wrecking incentives by means of a simple 
agency model. The effect on market prices and its dependence on shareholder structure 
is analysed in Section 5 using an auction model. Section 6 develops the empirical im-
plications and shows that the existing evidence corresponds well with the predictions of 
the model. Section 7 gives an outlook and concludes. 
2 Challenging  evidence  ... 
The underperformance of the stocks of distressed companies is an anomaly that 
comes with a twist. Fama and French (1996) and others have explained the anomalous 
high returns of "value stocks" by conjecturing that such firms are often close to bank-  3
ruptcy: Their prices have been driven down by a string of bad news. And bankruptcy 
risk is something that markets should rather dislike. For a number of reasons, losses due 
to default can be systematic, and the aggregate default rate is quite volatile. This argu-
ment amounts to the prediction of a positive ’default risk premium’ in the returns of high 
risk shares. 
Dichev (1998) was the first to show that prediction does not bear out and that the 
performance of high risk shares is actually very bad. Using Altman (1968) Z-score and 
Ohlson (1980) O-score ratings, he groups a CRSP-Compustat matched sample covering 
the years 1981 ￿ 1991 into decile portfolios based on the magnitude of bankruptcy 
score. Mean returns of high risk firms are compared with the average and with low risk 
firms. For both indicators, the performance of the firms with the highest bankruptcy risk 
is clearly worst. A trading strategy that goes long in an equally weighted portfolio of 
firms with a low bankruptcy risk and short in the firms with a high bankruptcy risk 
earns a monthly 1.17%, or 22.4% on an annual basis. The results are confirmed using 
regression tests.  
Griffin and Lemmon (2002) also find a negative relationship between financial 
distress as proxied by Ohlson’s (1980) O-score and subsequent returns, even after cor-
recting for the stochastic structure of returns by means of a Fama-French 3 factors 
model. In addition, they show that this relationship is driven by firms with a low book 
to market (BE/ME) ratio. The average return of low BE/ME firms in the highest quintile 
for Ohlson’s O-score is only 6.36%, about half of the average return in the other portfo-
lios and slightly lower than the risk free rate over that period. In the subset of firms with 
a high BE/ME ratio, the returns of distressed firms are not lower than would be ex-
pected by their BE/ME. In the quintile with the most distressed firms, the estimated 
return differential between high and low BE/ME firms is 14.44%. The results are robust 
to using the Altman (1968) Z-score indicator instead.  
Some contrary evidence is presented by Vassalou and Xing (2004) on the basis of 
a distance-to-default-measure. For the smallest firms, as well as for the firms with the 
very highest BE/ME ratio, the authors find a positive relationship between their measure 
of default risk, DLI, and the returns in the month after portfolio formation. Da and Gao 
(2005) repeat and interpret these estimations. They show that all the important results   4 
can be traced to first-month reversals, mostly due to data problems with penny stocks, 
such as bid-ask bounces and illiquidity.  
Two recent working papers complete the picture. Garlappi, Shu and Yan (2005) 
form six months cumulative returns from portfolios sorted according to default risk. 
Using Standard and Poor’s credit rating, they find an unconditional negative dependence 
of returns on default risk. Using instead the EDF measures generated by Moody’s KMV 
data, they find a negative relationship in the sub-sample of firms with a low BE/ME 
ratio. This study is important because the authors use real world default risk indicators 
that were sold to tens of thousands of market participants.  
Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi (2005) break new ground by constructing their 
own reduced form default risk indicator based on a logit model for bankruptcy and a 
broader concept of company failure. Sorting firms into ten different portfolios according 
to their estimated default risk, they show that the distressed firms strongly underperform 
financially healthy firms. The difference is magnified if returns are corrected using a 
CAPM or a Fama-French three-factor model. The three-factor alpha of the highest per-
centile of the failure risk distribution corresponds to a return of almost -25% at an 
annual rate. For the highest 5%, it is still less than -15% annualised. The long-short 
portfolio that goes long the 10% of stocks with the lowest failure risk and short the 10% 
of stocks with the highest failure risk would earn a whopping annual 23%, almost ex-
actly the same figure found by Dichev (1998). The study conditions on further variables 
and investigates the effect of momentum. These results and additional evidence will be 
discussed further in Section 6. 
3  ... in need of an explanation 
To date, three explanations have been advanced for the negative excess premium 
for the stocks of distressed firms. One possibility is, of course, that markets may be mal-
functioning. Griffin and Lemmon (2002) speak of ’mispricing’ and relate the size of the 
difference to indicators of informational asymmetry. However, this leaves the sign of 
the deviation unexplained ￿ why should informational asymmetry lead to systematic 
overpricing? Campbell et al. (2005) advance two versions. On the one hand, markets 
may be irrational. Specifically, financial institutions may have had a pronounced a priori   5
dislike of distressed firms￿ shares that is not justified by their return characteristics. 
With market shares of institutions going up, the shares of distress firms underper-
formed. Second, markets may be inefficient. Their information set may not encompass 
the default indicator constructed by the authors, although they were careful to make sure 
that its components were available at the time and a rolling estimation procedure was 
used to eliminate the look-ahead bias. This latter argument does not explain why the ef-
fect is also found when using real world default indicators that could be used by any-
body.
3  
Livdan, Sapriza and Zhang (2005) have advanced a structural explanation, based 
on risk. Financial constraints lead firms to reduce their investment. The reduction low-
ers their risk and hence their expected returns. This explanation has one principal short-
coming: it cannot explain why the returns of portfolios of distressed firms are low even 
after correcting for risk using a CAPM or a Fama-French three factor model, and why 
this correction worsens the anomaly. 
Another explanation based on the risk of share returns is offered by Garlappi et al. 
(2005). In the event of a bankruptcy, equity holders, depending on their bargaining 
power, may have the opportunity to violate the absolute priority rule and obtain pay-
ments over and above what would be left of the assets after the creditors had fully been 
paid. This gives equity holders something that resembles an American option: by 
declaring bankruptcy, they can always exchange their claim on future returns for a fixed 
fraction of total assets now. An optimal threshold value of bankruptcy is determined. In 
the neighbourhood of this threshold, the probability of default becomes very high, and 
the risk is accordingly low, because in the state of bankruptcy, the return is certain. As 
the risk of distressed firms is lower, the equity beta and the returns in equilibrium are 
lower, too. This explanation has the same fundamental shortcoming as the one by 
Livdan, Sapriza and Zhang (2005). Apart from that, it is not clear that the returns of 
equity holders in a bankruptcy procedure according to Chapter 11 can really be assessed 
as being close to certain, even if some violation of the absolute priority rule is expected. 
                                                 
3  As reported above, Garlappi et al (2005) use the EDF indicator by Moody’s KMV and Standard and 
Poor’s credit rating. Dichev (1998) and Griffin and Lemmon (2002) use the standard Altman Z-score 
and Ohlson O-score indicators with coefficients known from the literature.   6 
Still, in some important respects, the explanation resembles the one advanced in 
the following. In both cases, it is the dependence of expected non-dividend benefits on 
the probability of default that drives the results. But whereas the reasoning of Garlappi 
et al. relies on second moments, our explanation is based on first moments. 
Imagine a firm being hit by a series of negative shocks, making losses and ap-
proaching a state of financial distress. With higher leverage, volatility increases and the 
expected value of cash flows to shareholders goes down. But certain groups of well-
informed insiders can draw returns on their investment in ways other than by receiving 
a cash dividend if they are in control of the firm.  
Equity is not only a right to receive dividends, it also confers control rights. These 
control rights have an economic value of their own, as they enable owners to draw a 
return in kind. The benefits of corporate control comprise all non-dividend economic 
benefits of ownership, by no means necessarily illegal ones. Although they do not show 
up in the books, the benefits of corporate control are economically equivalent to a divi-
dend, and will be valued as such ￿ not only by the ultimate beneficiary, but also by all 
other market participants who try to form rational price expectations.  
The transfer of assets out of firms for the benefit of those who control them has 
been labelled ￿tunneling￿ by Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2000). 
They use legal cases to establish that in developed countries, too, the diversion of cor-
porate resources from the corporation to the controlling shareholder can be substantial, 
and that much of this diversion is legal. They number a variety of forms of diverting 
resources, 
including expropriation of corporate opportunities from a firm by its controlling shareholder, trans-
fer pricing favoring the controlling shareholder, transfer of assets from a firm to its controlling 
shareholder at nonmarket prices, loan guarantees using the firms asset as collateral, and so on.
4  
Akerlof and Romer (1993) give an extremely vivid account of "bankruptcy for 
profit" during the 1980’s, focussing on four historic events: the Chilean financial crisis, 
U.S. Savings and Loans regulatory changes, the Dallas/Fort Worth buildings boom and 
bust, and the US junk bond-financed takeover wave.  
Our hypothesis is that the benefits conferred by ownership of a private company 
will form a disproportionately large part of the total payoff of distressed firms. This may   7
be termed the ￿wreckers theory￿ of financial distress. Firms close to bankruptcy will be 
stripped of their assets, as the opportunity costs of not doing so are high. The resulting 
returns are a substantial part of the value of equity. For insiders with special uses for the 
firms￿ resources, distressed firms are an easier prey than healthy firms. The causality 
also goes the other way: Companies that are being depleted by insiders will very soon 
find themselves in a situation of financial distress. Eventually, and maybe most impor-
tantly, the process is self-reinforcing. With the conditional probability of bankruptcy 
increasing, it seems less and less advantageous to the owners to leave valuable resources 
in the firm. Thus, well-intentioned owners can turn into wreckers quite against their 
own inclination. Wrecks and wreckers are correlated phenomena: one causes the other.  
Our argument rests on two pillars that need to be investigated more closely. First, 
we need to show that the incentives to withdraw resources from the firm in the form of 
private benefits do indeed become stronger as the firms approaches bankruptcy. Section 
4 introduces a simple agency model of optimal management behaviour under the risk of 
default where management can choose between a strategy that maximises the overall 
firm value and a technically inefficient strategy involving relocations of resources to 
equity holders. Debt contracts are incomplete, and no system of covenants can fully rule 
out this type of action. The inefficient strategy becomes optimal once leverage is high 
enough.  
The second step is to reflect on the conditions under which the value of control 
benefits will show up in the share prices of ailing firms. There is a broad literature ex-
plaining the price difference between voting and non-voting stocks in terms of private 
benefits of control and the expectation that the votes will become valuable in a contest 
between rivalling parties. In Section 5, we argue that the resulting premium will be 
large for a firm close to default, as the non-cash components of the return to equity are 
important and the probability of a contest for control is high. It is rather unlikely that the 
original management team, supported by some coalition of shareholders, is the most 
efficient wrecker. And even if they are, there will be other groups who think the same of 
themselves. 
                                                                                                                                               
4  Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2000), p. 26.   8 
4  Financial distress and wrecking incentives 
Generally speaking, the moral hazard problems caused by limited liability are well 
known, notably the tendency to accept projects with a high risk, but a low expected re-
turn as investigated by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). For 
overviews see, for example, Grinblatt and Titman (2002), Ch. 16, or Freixas and Rochet 
(1997). The agency conflict described in this paper is close to the one investigated by 
Innes (1990), who shows how the incentive of an owner-entrepreneur to work hard are 
influenced by the terms of the debt contract. With respect to the specific problem of 
private benefits, however, the literature by and large has followed the seminal paper by 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) in modelling the diversion of funds primarily within the 
context of an agency conflict between insiders and outside equity holders, not between 
equity holders and creditors.  
One exception is Hart (1995, Sections 5.2-5.4), who argues that the liquidation 
value of the assets must be larger than the value of all the payment obligations at each 
point in time to keep the entrepreneur from diverting the returns. Johnson, Boone, 
Breach and Friedman (2000) show that managers with an equity stake have greater in-
centives to steal when the returns of capital drop. Their model does not recognise un-
certainty. Similarly, Akerlof and Romer (1993) show that the chance of a dividend 
payout larger than the true economic value of equity will induce the owners of the firm 
to extract a maximum amount of cash and let the firm go bankrupt. Without taking un-
certainty into account, they focus on the institutional preconditions for successful 
"bankruptcy for profit" to take place, calling the resulting activity "looting". We com-
plement their analysis by focussing on the significance of leverage and the probability 
of default for the incentives to divert resources, in an agency conflict between equity 
holders and creditors. 
The conflict derives from the fact that when a firm is close to bankruptcy, it is the 
creditors who are the true residual owners in many states of the world, but the equity-
holders maintain their residual control rights. In order to show first the incentives to 
relocate assets from the firm in case of financial distress, let us consider the case of a 
selfless management that maximises the value of equity, as would be the case with an 
owner-managed firm. At this point, we do not distinguish between classes of equity   9
holders. We consider one period only, with two points in time:  0 t =  and tT = . The 
management has the opportunity to take an unobservable action that yields benefits to 
equity holders, thereby reducing the overall firm value. Taking the action will reduce 
the firm value by the amount d (standing for ￿damage￿) and leads to private benefits 
() Gd, with  () 00 G =  and  () 0 Gd d <<  for  0 d > . That is, we assume that taking such 
private benefits is socially inefficient. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that there 
are only two possible values for d: 
{ } 0, d ∈ l .      (1) 
The firm value in tT =  is a random variable with a distribution that depends on the 
market value of the firm￿s assets, A, and the managerial action: 
() jj VT Adε =−+.      (2) 
Here, j is an index for the state of nature. The shock  j ε  follows a distribution function 
Φ. To avoid asset stripping, there is a contractual ceiling to dividend payments, and 
without loss of generality we normalise it to zero. Choosing d = l is essentially an 
inefficient substitute for ￿milking the property￿ by means of high dividends. Unlike 
dividends, the action d and the implied loss of resources are invisible (or at least not 
verifiable), and cannot be contracted upon.  
The firm value is the sum of the value  ( ) j ST  of payments to shareholders and 
payouts  () j B T  to creditors: 
() () () jjj VT ST BT =+.     (3) 
Creditors￿ claims have face value F. Limited liability of shareholders means that 
() () { } min , jj B TF V T =   and   ( ) ( ) { } max 0, jj ST VT F =− .   (4) 
The probability of default is given by 
() () ( ) ( ) prob prob jj VT F Ad F F Ad ε < =− + < = Φ − + .     (5) 
Note that the decision on d has consequences for the default probability. The objective 
function of the management is the present value of  total benefits, cash and non-cash:   10 
() () () Wd Gd Sd =+.     (6) 
We will refer to  ( ) Sd as the cash value of equity and to  ( ) Gdas the non-cash benefit 
under d. In order to simplify matters, we will assume that the non-cash benefit is cer-
tain. The future cash payment in T, however, is uncertain. We assume that it is spanned 
by existing assets. If K is the number of possible states of nature at time T, then given 
the absence of arbitrage opportunities there exists a stochastic discount factor,
5 a strictly 
positive vector ψ ++ ∈
K R  such that the present value of equity is 



















=− − + >
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In other words, the present value of equity is a weighted sum over the residual value in 
the future, taken over those states where this residual is positive.  
It is a rather straightforward matter to show that the incentive to take the non-cash 
benefit becomes stronger as the firm’s financial position deteriorates. The value of 
choosing d = l over  0 d =  is given by 
() () () ( ) ( ) 00 WW W G S S ∆= − = + − ll l .     (8) 
Relocating assets from the firm is optimal if the benefit  ( ) G l  is higher than the loss in 
cash value of equity induced by this decision, that is  ( ) 0 GS +∆> l , with  






SS S A F A F
εε
ψ εψ ε
−− + > −+ >
∆ = − = −− + − −+ ∑∑
l
ll .   (9) 
It is convenient to distinguish three cases, or sets of states: 
￿  Case A (Default will not occur under either policy):  { } 0 j Aj A F ε = −− + ≥ l . 
￿  Case B (Default occurs under policy d = l, but not under policy  0 d = ): 
{ } 0 jj B j AF AF ε ε =− + ≥ > − − + l . 
                                                 
5   See, e.g., Duffie (2001), Ch. 1.   11
￿  Case C (Default occurs under both policies):  { } 0 j Cj A F ε = −+< . 
We can then rewrite the share value differential as 
() jj j
jA jB
SA F ψ ψε
∈∈
⎛⎞
∆= − + − + ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ∑∑ l .       (10) 
The owners bear the full cost of taking the non-cash benefit only in those states 
where the firm would have survived with and without the detrimental policy, that is, in 
the states collected in case A. They still bear a fraction of the costs in those states where 
the firm would have survived under  0, d =  but has to declare bankruptcy under d = l. 
In those states, collected in case B, the costs to shareholders are strictly less than the 
social costs l. And relocation is essentially a free lunch for shareholders in the states 
collected in case C, when the firm will default on its debt even when playing the "hon-
est" strategy  0 d = . Then the full social costs of the relocation are borne by the credi-
tors. Equation (10) allows us to see three important facts. 
1.  The social cost of taking action d = l instead of  0 d =  is equal to the cost to the 
shareholders if the risk of default is absent, i.e. if  ( ) j VT F ≥  for both strategies and 
in all states of nature. 
2.  If there is a risk of default, the cost of taking action d = l for shareholders is strictly 
less than the social cost. This is a simple consequence of limited liability. In effect, 
the creditors not only have to bear part of the economic risk embodied in the shock 
j ε , but also part of the costs of deviating from strategies that maximise firm value.  
3.  The cost to shareholders of taking action d = l is increasing in the financial posi-
tion,  A F − . 
In the states pertaining to case B, the costs increase one-to-one with  A F − . Further-
more, for each state of nature there are two threshold values for  A F − , marking the 
boundaries between the cases A, B and C. If the threshold  j AFε − =  is surpassed, the 
state switches from C to B. At a still higher value,  j AFε − =+ l, state j passes the the 
boundary between cases B and A. Increasing  A F −  therefore pushes more and more 
states from category C, where the action essentially is a free lunch for shareholders, to   12 
B, where the shareholders bear part of the consequences; and from B to A, where the 
shareholders bear the full cost.  
The incentive to relocate resources from the firm,  S ∆ , is a continuous (though not 
everywhere differentiable) function of the financial position  AF − . As long as not all 
states of nature are in category A, the absolute value of  S ∆  will be increasing in the 
financial position,  A F − . It will be strictly increasing if at least one state of nature is in 
regime B.  
We have assumed that the relocation decision is socially inefficient,  () G < ll . 
Thus, it will not be chosen when  AF −  is high enough for there to be no default risk. 
On the other hand, d = l will certainly be chosen if default is guaranteed, i.e. if  A F −  
is so low that default cannot be avoided. Then, the intermediate value theorem guaran-
tees that there is a K* such that the socially efficient strategy,  0 d = , will be optimal for 
all  * AF K −≥ , but d = l will be chosen if  * AF K − < . This is true no matter how 
small  () G l  is in comparison to l. Any sort of wasteful activity will happen if the 
financial situation is bad enough. 
We have shown that under financial distress there is a strong tendency to choose 
strategies that are inefficient but confer a benefit on equity holders. 
5  A wrecking premium in the share prices 
The incentives to divert company resources for private use drive a wedge between 
the expected value of cash flows and the total value of equity. The difference between 
the two is simply  ( ) G l . But we have yet to explain how the value of non-cash benefits 
will show up in share price quotations. Typically, these quotations reflect trades of mar-
ginal investors, i.e. minority or outside shareholders, and in most cases these marginal 
investors will not benefit from the relocations.  
There is a growing literature on the question of whether and how private benefits 
of control enter stock market valuations. In this literature, the focus is on the protection 
of minority shareholders from expropriation by the controlling team. Le Maux (2003) 
gives a recent overview. Empirically, two main routes have been taken. One strand of 
literature, starting with Barclay and Holderness (1989), observes privately negotiated   13
transfers of controlling blocks and compares them with the stock market price prior to 
this transfer. In order to make sure that the votes of shares traded on the stock market 
will carry little or no value, periods with an elevated probability of a control contest are 
excluded. The second method, pioneered by Lease, McConnel and Mikkelson (1983, 
1984), relies on comparing stock market prices when different classes of shares are 
quoted. If there are two classes of shares with identical cash flow rights, but one class 
carries votes and the other does not, the price differential must be interpreted as the 
market price of votes and is indicative of private benefits. 
For our purposes, it is important to understand the circumstances under which a 
positive price for votes will result. Ordinarily, transactions take place between non-con-
trolling parties who cannot expect to receive any control benefits themselves. The pri-
vate benefits of control, which are essentially invisible, are translated into an easily ob-
servable market price of a vote by the expectation that the vote will become valuable in 
a contest for control. For share prices to rise above expected cash flows from dividends 
there must be a positive probability of a contest, in the form of a proxy fight or a tender 
offer. In such a contest, when rival teams are bidding for votes in order to gain access to 
the private benefits of control, the winner must outbid the maximum price that the rival 
party is willing to pay. With private benefits involved, the price the winner pays for 
minority shares will be higher than the subsequent cash flows. If shareholders attribute a 
positive probability to such a situation, a premium of share prices in excess of cash 
flows will show up even before the contest.
6 The price run ups that occur before tender 
offers are well documented. 
The price of a vote in a contest will depend on the distribution of shareholdings. 
At the one extreme, it is easily seen that the price of votes is nil if one shareholder has a 
controlling majority of more than 50%, provided this is the relevant majority. For an 
outsider trying to gain control, a tender offer or a proxy fight would be useless. Instead, 
the contender must deal directly with the majority owner, and if there are payments in 
excess of the cash flow values, these would be made to the majority owner alone. On 
                                                 
6   In order to make inferences on the size of private benefits, the method relying on differential voting 
rights needs additional assumptions regarding the probability of control contests. The first method, on 
the other hand, suffers from a relative dearth of observations. A country-by-country comparison of the 
results obtained by Dyck and Zingales (2004) and Nenova (2003), as well as the survey of Le Maux   14 
the other hand, if we assume dispersed ownership, large parts of the private benefits will 
show up in a takeover contest. In their study on managerial stock ownership, DeAngelo 
and DeAngelo (1985) find that the voting premium can become extremely high when 
control of the firm is at stake. In order to tell the story as simply as possible we will 
adapt first Zingales￿ (1994, 1995) and then Rydqvist’s (1996) model to our problem.
7 
In a contest for control bidders reveal their preferences. There must be at least two 
potential competitors. We will assume that the non-verifiable benefits G are in fact pri-
vate benefits to the controlling party alone. Let player i be the incumbent team in con-
trol of the firm and let r be the rival who challenges control. We assume that the contest 
for control takes the form of a tender offer.  i P  and  r P  are the bids of the incumbent and 
the rival, respectively. Here, following Zingales (1995), we will make two assumptions 
that will be dropped later on. 
(a) All shareholders are "small", in that they do not expect their vote to be pivotal.  
(b) The offer must be unrestricted, i.e. the bid involves all of the companies￿ securities. 
Shareholders will tender to the higher bidder, provided that the bid is at least as 
high as the value of cash flow under the winning team. The latter condition is the free-
rider problem with takeover bids analysed by Grossman and Hart (1980). We want to 
address it as the Grossman-Hart incentive compatibility constraint (ICC).  
The value of the entire firm is equal to  ii GV +  for the incumbent and  rr GV +  to 
the rival. Shareholders will tend to the rival unless the follow-up bid by the incumbent 
is higher. In order to win, the rival’s bid must be equal to or higher than the highest bid 
the incumbent can make without losing money: 
ri i PGV ≥+ .       ( 1 1 )  
The right-hand side is the break-even point for the incumbent. Furthermore, the 
bid must reach the value of the cash flow that would be created under the rival’s own 
management: 
                                                                                                                                               
(2004) demonstrates that the two methods of inference come to very similar conclusions. For us it is 
important simply to show that private benefits of control are reflected in share prices. 
7  Similar results could also be obtained from the closely related frameworks by Grossman and Hart 
(1980, 1988), Harris and Raviv (1988), and Nenova (2003), with differences in the details.   15
rr PV ≥ .      ( 1 2 )  
Thus, the rival will make a winning bid of  
()
* max , rr i i PV G V =+ ,     (13) 
if it is profitable to do so. We will call a bidder "superior" if  rr ii GVGV +≥+ , and 
"dominant" if  ri i VG V ≥+ . The first inequality is sufficient for the bidder to make a 
winning bid; the second inequality depicts the case in which, under the rival’s policy, 
the projected cash flow alone is higher than the entire value of equity under the incum-
bent. We can distinguish three cases. 
a)   The bidder is superior, but not dominant, i.e.  ii r r ii GVGV GV + −≤<+ . In this case 
the willing bid will be 
*
ri i PG V =+ .       ( 1 4 )  
The winner pays a premium above the cash flow value of the shares as a result of the 
contest for control. This premium is labelled "surplus-extraction￿ by Grossman and Hart 
(1988). 
b)  The bidder is dominant, that is  ri i VG V ≥+ . The binding constraint for the optimal 
bid is given by the free-riding behaviour of shareholders:  
*
rr PV = .       ( 1 5 )  
c)  The bidder is not superior, i.e.  rr ii GVGV + <+ . He will make no bid and control 
remains with the incumbent.
8 
Thus, we have seen that if a changeover of control takes place, the winning bid 
will be at least as high as the entire value of equity (private and cash flow benefits) un-
der the incumbent party. If there is more than one bidder, the relevant lower bound is 
the entire value of equity under the second best management team.  
                                                 
8   Note that this is a rather extreme assumption in the context of what we want to show. If there is no 
certainty on the side of the rival as to the private benefits of the incumbent, the rival may choose to 
make an offer that maximises the conditional expected payoff. If repeated counteroffers are possible, 
as in an English auction, the incumbent would be forced to make a bid of 
rr GV + , the value of the firm 
to the rival.    16 
Now, let π  be the probability that a superior rival shows up, or more precisely: let 
the rivals be drawn from a known distribution and let π  be the probability that the rival 
is superior, ie:  rr ii GVGV + ≥+ . Furthermore, let  r P %  be the expected tender bid condi-
tional on the rival being superior, and  r V %  the expected value of cash flow in this case. 
Then, the value of the shares, with risk neutral investors, will be 
() 1 1 r PP V ππ =+ − % .       ( 1 6 )  
If the investors are risk-averse, we can interpret π as the appropriate risk neutral 
probability, given the true probabilities and the vector of state prices, see again Duffie 
(2001), Ch. 1. On the other hand, the value of expected cash flow is 
() 1 E1 r VV V ππ =+ − % .     (17) 
We are interested in the conditions for the share price before the contest to be 
higher than the value of expected cash flow,  E PV > . This will be the case if and only 
if  0 π >  and  rr PV > %% . There must be a positive probability of a rival making a bid and 
that this bid will exceed the value of cash flow the rival herself is going to generate. 
That means that surplus extraction occurs, and the Grossman-Hart ICC must not bind. 
We have seen that this will happen when the rival is superior, but not dominant.  
In the case of a financially distressed company it is extremely unlikely that the ri-
val will dominate. A dominant rival is able to generate a cash flow to shareholders that 
is higher than the sum of private benefits and cash flows generated by the incumbent. 
With a low or negative AF − , the expected cash flows to shareholders are small even 
when no relocation takes place, whereas the size of  i G  can be assumed to be a function 
of total assets, A, not of net worth.  
We are in a position now to state why the premium paid in excess of expected 
cash flows will be high when the firm is financially distressed, relative to healthy firms: 
a)  The share of private benefits as a percentage of the overall value of equity is high 
when firms are distressed. In many cases, relocation policies may be the only way to 
extract any benefit at all from the firm. And it is these private benefits that make a 
superior rival bid higher than the expected cash flows. At the same time, the case of   17
a dominant rival ￿ which might be quite usual under normal circumstances ￿ be-
comes extremely unlikely. 
b)  The probability of a contest for control is high when the firm is distressed. It is 
unlikely that the controlling party that was installed in better times is the most effi-
cient wrecker. In many cases, the efficient wrecker will be a close competitor, who 
is able to make good use of the material and immaterial assets of the firm, and to 
whom the market position of the firm matters most. In other cases, a management 
buy-out will result, with the management trying to make use of their superior 
knowledge with respect to the value of the firm’s assets.
9  
In many cases, contestants will already possess large blocks of ownership, so-
called toe-holds, which alters their strategic position in an important way. Furthermore, 
they will not necessarily bid for the entire outstanding equity, but only for the quantity 
they need in order to achieve control. This case is investigated in the Appendix, adapt-
ing a model by Rydqvist. The principal conclusions reached above go through. How-
ever, a large part of outstanding equity will remain in the hands of minority sharehold-
ers under these circumstances, and the Grossman-Hart ICC becomes even easier to sur-
mount, as only half of the cash flow is relevant for bidders.  
6  Testing the hypothesis 
Assume that there is a contest for control with probability α. If it takes place, the 
winner pays, for a fraction φ of the shares, the value of the stream of expected dividends 












+ + ∑ .     (18) 
Here, ￿ is an asset specific one-period discount rate. The premium ω may or may 
not fully reflect the value of private benefits of control, depending on the distribution of 
                                                 
9   Debtors themselves are also potential candidates. In order to rescue the economic value of their assets, 
a subset of creditors may want to buy the firm themselves. Whether a premium results in this case de-
pends on whether these new majority shareholders are willing to generate private benefits, exploiting 
other creditors and minority shareholders. We beg this question by assuming that creditors are either 
credit constrained, unable to run the firm or prevented from taking it over by institutions like the Glass-
Steagall Act of 1933.   18 
power between contestants. Shares that are not tendered to the winner will be bought 
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+ + ∑ .     (20) 
If there is no contest, the value of shareholder portfolios is equal to the appropri-
ately discounted dividends alone. For simplicity we assume that expected dividends are 
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+ + ∑ .   (22) 
As we have seen above, the factor π is a risk neutral probability and may be 
smaller than the true probability α, reflecting the valuation of contest risk in period t. In 
period t+1, after the contest has or has not occurred, the valuation of marginal share-
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The left-hand side is the sum of capital gains and cash dividends, corrected by the 
required rate of return for assets of this risk class. The right-hand side shows the alpha 
that will be measured in an asset valuation equation such as the CAPM or the Fama and 
French 3 factor model. It is equal to the expected premium that will be paid by contest-
ants as a share of the market value, taking into account the possibility that there may not 
be such a contest, and corrected by an assessment of contest risk. Of course, it is not 
necessary to assume agents to believe that the contest takes place either at the end of 
this period or not at all. The left-hand side is the value of the possibility that a premium 
will be paid at any time in the future. 
For the wreckers theory to hold, it is enough that  t p π ω  be an increasing func-
tion of default probability. This means that for endangered firms the share of the ex-
pected takeover premium as a component of the overall value for marginal sharehold-
ers in (22) must be higher than for healthy firms. This is a rather mild requirement, 
given that in many cases distressed companies do not pay out any dividends at all. A 
viable way of estimating the value of the expected premium is 
￿  to sort firms into portfolios according to their default risk, and calculate returns 
￿  to estimate a CAPM or a factor model in order to generate the appropriate risk-ad-
justed returns, and then 
￿  to compare the alphas of portfolios with high and low default risk. If the portfolio 
with the lowest default risk does contain any takeover premium as a compensation 
for private benefits, then the excess returns of the higher risk portfolios is a direct 
estimate of value of the expected wrecking premium. If this is not true, then the ex-
cess returns give us the economic value of the differential takeover premium, in-
duced by wrecking incentives. 
Thus, the excess returns measured by Griffin and Lemmon (2002) and Campbell et al. 
(2005) may simply be a fair estimate of the discounted expected premium that candi-
dates for takeover are willing to pay in exchange for being able to either actively deplete 
the resources of their company, or use them in a way that is beneficial to their other 
interests. We have seen that excess returns are a smoothly decreasing function of default 
risk, as they should be according the wreckers theory. The results of Dichev (1998) 
speak the same language, although returns were not adjusted for risk.    20 
One might argue that given the hypothetical returns calculated for a strategy that 
shorts a portfolio of distressed stocks and is long in the shares of healthy companies, it 
would be possible to generate return from a zero net investment with a very small risk. 
This seems to be a direct implication of the negative excess returns. However, if an in-
vestor goes short in a security, he has to pay the broker any income that would have 
been received on this security. The broker will transfer this income to the account of the 
client from whom the security was borrowed. In the case of a tender offer, the premium 
of the tendered shares over the not tendered shares will be part of that income. Other-
wise, if there is the expectation of a tender offer, the lender would not be willing to lend 
out his stock, or he would demand an appropriate lending fee. 
The theory also accords well with the results for subsets of companies in the lit-
erature. Given default risk, the wrecking premium should be higher for small firms, as it 
will be easier to generate returns in kind using the control rights of equity if there is no 
multi-layered management and a complicated set of corporate governance devices. And 
this is the evidence that Campbell et al. (2005) brought up. For large firms, there is an 
annualised returns differential of 11.5% between low-risk firm and high-risk firms. For 
the smallest size category, it is 17.5%.  
The same authors show that distressed firms have low book-to-market ratios, like 
growth stocks, although they have the factor loadings of value stocks, since they load 
positively on the Fama-French value factor. These low book-to-market ratios are also 
noted by Griffin and Lemmon (2002) and Dichev (1998). They may indicate the pres-
ence of a wrecking premium in the market value. Imagine that the book value gives a 
correct account of the liquidation value. If market prices are higher, equity holders as a 
group seem to expect additional benefits. But we expect a premium only for the stocks 
of those distressed companies where a takeover contest is expected. If this is impossible, 
because there already is a dominant owner, or if wrecking is impossible for other rea-
sons, there should be no negative excess returns. Consistent with this, Griffin and 
Lemmon (2002) show that the underperformance of distressed stock is highest when 
they have the lowest book-to-market ratio. Garlappi et al. (2005) find that the negative 
relationship between probability of default and returns is restricted to the firms with low 
BE/ME ratio. Campbell et al. (2005) also observe a maximum underperformance for   21
low BE/ME firms, although underperformance is also high in the subset of the firms 
with the very highest BE/ME ratios.  
Finally, it is clear that the negative excess return should show a large degree of 
persistence, as depleting the company takes time and the expectation of a takeover con-
test will be upheld over a longer period in many cases. Again, Campbell et al. (2005) 
have done the test for us. In addition to the CAPM alphas and the three-factor alphas, 
they calculate alphas on the basis of the four-factor model proposed by Carhart (1997) 
which also includes a momentum factor. This momentum factor offers no explanation 
of return differentials in terms of risk, but it shows how much of the excessive return 
can be attributed to the fact that they are persistent. It turns out that using the four-factor 
model including a momentum portfolio cuts the negative alphas of distressed stocks 
roughly in half, although there is little effect on the excess return of the portfolio formed 
on the very highest percentile of default risk.  
Some further evidence comes from the literature on block sales premiums. As a 
measure of financial distress, Dyck and Zingales (2004) use a dummy variable that 
takes a value of one if earnings per share were zero or negative in the year of a block 
trade or before and obtain a weakly significant negative coefficient in their block-trade 
regression. However, past returns are not a valid measure of the incentives to deviate 
funds. Barclay and Holderness (1989) show that the premium paid for the sale of large 
blocks is positively related to the financial leverage of the company and the amount of 
disposable free cash, which both accord well with the wreckers theory.
10  
Thus, the theory is able to explain the existing evidence very well, without in-
voking irrational or inefficient behaviour.  
7 Outlook 
The explanation advanced here focuses on the non-financial rewards of corporate 
control. Johnson, Boone, Breach and Friedman (2000) have shown that measures of 
corporate governance, particularly the protection of minority shareholders, explain the 
extent of losses during the Asian crisis. They conjecture that in countries with weak 
                                                 
10 More precisely, the two variables are insignificant for the sample as a whole. They turn significant 
when the purchaser is an individual.   22 
corporate governance, worse economic prospects result in more expropriation by man-
agers and thus a larger fall in asset prices. Our short paper highlights an additional 
mechanism triggered by the high probability of default that can drive this relationship. 
The inefficiencies created by wrecking behaviour may amplify real and financial 
shocks. 
The probability of contests for control may also differ among industries. For ex-
ample, in growing industries the private benefits that can be realised by a competitor are 
likely to be larger than in a declining industry. The same is true of concentrated indus-
tries as opposed to competitive industries: using a Herfindahl index, Garlappi et al. 
(2005) have found evidence confirming this conjecture. 
We want to point out a rather strong prediction with respect to the relationship 
between financial stature and excess returns. It may serve as a definite test of the hy-
pothesis advanced here. Our modelling exercise has shown that in order for a wreckers￿ 
premium to show up, there must be a positive probability of a contest of control, with at 
least two parties competing for the private benefits, and the expectation that the winner 
will have to pay a premium over the cash value. We have seen that such a contest is not 
to be expected if there is a controlling shareholder. Therefore, the negative excess pre-
mium should not exist in a portfolio of distressed firms that have a majority owner. 
These shares should trade at the value of their expected dividend or liquidation pay-
ments. With dispersed ownership, on the other hand, the existence of a premium can be 
predicted. It would therefore be interesting to investigate empirically whether financial 
distress is associated by a change in control and whether there is evidence of overpric-
ing for distressed stocks with a majority owner.    23
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Appendix: The wreckers' premium in a model with large shareholders 
The main results of the model presented in the text are kept intact if we allow for 
competitors that control large blocks of shares, as well as for the possibility of making 
bids for only a fraction of the equity shares. This case was analysed by Rydqvist (1996), 
and we will adapt his model to the problem at hand.  
We assume that the incumbent owns a fraction  i e  and the rival owns a fraction  r e  
of the shares. The rest is held, as before, by atomistic shareholders. Incumbent and rival 
parties have private benefits  i G  and  r G , and plan to generate cash flows  i V  and  r V , 
respectively. No bargaining between the agents is allowed. In a contest, a fraction of 0.5 
is needed to secure control and reap the private benefits. Parties submit bids for what is 
missing to reach the simple majority, 0.5 i e −  and 0.5 r e − . Thus, the number of shares 
the contestants buy may differ. Both initial holdings  r e  and  i e  are smaller than 0.5. Bids 
are unconditional ￿ the contestants commit themselves to take all shares when less than 
the required number of shares is tendered to them.
11 Oversubscribed bids are pro rated. 
We start by computing the contestants￿ break-even bid, which is the highest bid 
they can make without losing money if they win. The incumbent faces an offer P per 
share by the rival. If the incumbent makes a (infinitesimally higher) counter-offer and 
wins, the incumbent￿s payout will be 
() 0.5 0.5 ii i GV e P +− −.     (A1) 
with the outstanding equity normalised to 1. If, instead, the incumbent tenders to 
the rival, with a portion  r f  being accepted, the incumbent’s payoff is 
() 1 ir rr ef P fV +− ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ .    (A2) 
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of the proffered shares will be accepted, and the rest returned. The break-even point is 
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.     (A5) 
The winning bid will be at least as large as the lower of the two break-even bids: 
                                                 
11 This ensures that the shareholders tender to the contestant with the higher bid, even when they suspect 
that he may not reach the majority, see Grossman and Hart (1988).   26 
[ ]
* min , ir PP P ≥ .   (A6) 
The winning bid may be higher than this lower bound for two reasons. One is the 
Grossman and Hart ICC: the winning bid must be at least as high as the cash flow gen-
erated by the winner herself. It is only when the Grossman-Hart ICC is binding that 
there will be no rent extraction and no wreckers￿ premium. The other is that the loser 
has incentives to bid higher than her break-even bid. Overbidding may force the 
adversary to make a counter-offer, giving the loser the opportunity to trade in the shares 
at a higher price.
12 If we assume perfect knowledge with respect to both agents￿ 
valuation, the winning bid will have to be the higher of the two break-even bids,  
[ ]
* max , ir PP P = ,      (A7) 
if the Grossman-Hart ICC does not bind. The losing party would not let the win-
ner have it for less. The more generic case of a private valuation auction has been in-
vestigated by Burkart (1995). He shows that an agent with a toehold will invariably bid 
in excess to her valuation. The winning bid may even be higher than  [ ] max , ir PP  in this 
case. We assume that the agent with the higher valuation wins, as will be the case under 
certainty. However, we do not want to exploit the overbidding feature fully, but rather 
see (A7) as a lower bound for the outcome. Suppose first that the higher valuation is 
with the rival. The condition for the Grossman-Hart ICC to be not binding at the lower 
bound, i.e. ir PV > , is given by  
() 0.5 ir i GV V >− .   (A8) 
If the condition holds, there will be rent extraction, as the bid 
* P  is higher than 
the subsequent cash flows r V .
13 An analogous condition holds for the case that the 
incumbent wins. We may now compare the results with the simple Zingales (1995) 
case. Prior to the contest, there will be a wreckers’ premium in the market price of 
shares if  
(1)Market participants see a positive probability of a contest taking place and  
2)Condition (A8) for rent extraction is fulfilled. 
The probability in (1) is extremely high in our current modelling context, as it 
pays for the rival to put up even a losing fight as soon as  ri PV > . Such a fight gives the 
rival the possibility of selling a part of her shares to the incumbent at a premium. Sec-
ond, condition (A2) is very similar in structure to the corresponding condition 
ir i GVV >−  for the Zingales (1995) case, but it is milder, as only half the total cash flow 
of the firm is relevant for the two bidders. Thus, if none of the competitors is dominant, 
condition (A8) will be fulfilled a forteriori, and there will be rent extraction in a contest 
and a premium in the share prices.
14 
                                                 
12 Rydqvist (1996) assumes that there will be no overbidding. We do not need to make this assumption. 
13 If the condition does not hold, the relevant lower bound is 
r V . Note that (A8) is merely a sufficient 
condition for rent extraction to take place, as overbidding may result in higher winning bids.  
14 It has to be noted, though, that this does not mean that the premium will be necessarily higher than in 
the Zingales (1995) case. The winning bid may be lower if the winner needs to buy only a few shares. 
The dependence of the premium on the ownership structure is investigated further in Rydqvist (1996).   
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